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We live at a time when technological progress has augmented and intensified 
our natural inclination to self-preservation while also arresting and eclipsing our 
moral wisdom. Thus, Pope John Paul II's October 1993 encyclical, Veritatis 
Splendor (The Splendor of the Truth) is the very moral wisdom that we are 
groping for. The encyclical is historic as well as timely because it marks the first 
time in the history of the Church that the Pope has addressed and defended the 
very foundations of morality against the rampant skepticism and confusion about 
moral norms. One of the most outstanding points of the encyclical is the 
upholding of the consistent teaching of the Church that a human act, 
independently of the intention of the agent or circumstances connected to the act, 
can be intrinsically evil and can be known to be so. In n. 80 of the encyclical, 
Pope John Paul II makes this point and then cites a passage from Gaudium et 
Spes that names some of these intrinsically evil acts. 
Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, 
euthanasia and voluntary suicide; whatever violates the integrity of the human person, 
such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit; 
whatever is offensive to human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary 
imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution and trafficking in women and children; 
degrading conditions of work which treat laborers as mere instruments of profit and not 
as free responsible persons: all these and the like are a disgrace, and so long as they infect 
human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer 
injustice, and they are a negation of the honor due to the Creator. (emphasis added)' 
I had put a good deal of thought into the moral justification of bodily 
mutilation for the sake of organ donation prior to the publication of Veritatis 
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Splendor and I had already been struggling with this question. However, the 
mention of "mutilations" in this list of intrinsically evil acts obliges the moral 
theologian to press on with this question with ever greater intensity. In my 
reflections, I will restrict myself to organ donations from a living donor, even if I 
also think that organ donations from cadavers raise many serious questions. 
Please also take note that I want to press this issue into a corner. I am in search of 
an honest and consistent answer. It is my view that we have been fudging on this 
issue. 
It is interesting to note that, in recent years, whenever the Magisterium has 
spoken on the topic of organ donation, the motive of charity has been lifted up 
and praised. However, to the best of my knowledge, the Magisterium has not 
addressed the moral species of the act of bodily mutilation for the sake of organ 
donation, independently of the intention or circumstances, at least not until 
Veritatis Splendor, and there, as noted, only in passing. 
Pope Pius XII was the first Pontiff to address the issue in a direct and 
fundamental way. At that time, when the practice of organ transplanting was at 
its infancy, there were attempts to articulate the moral justification of bodily 
mutilation on the basis of the principle of totality. According to that principle, all 
the parts of the human body, as parts, are meant to exist and function for the good 
of the whole body, and are thus naturally subordinated to the good of the whole 
body. Pope Pius XII was very clear in his teaching that the principle of totality 
could not be the basis of the moral justification of bodily mutilation. The 
principle oftotality, the Pontiff pointed out, referred to the natural, physical body 
and not to the moral body of civil society. Extending the principle of totality to 
include the moral body of civil society, he noted, would leave the door open to 
the moral justification of subjecting the body of the human person to the service 
of ci vii society. According to the principle of totality, the Pope noted, the parts of 
the human body serve the whole body, of which it is a natural part. The principle 
of totality does not envision the part of one human body serving another human 
body.2 
In the course of this discussion, theologians began to distinguish between 
major and minor mutilations of the body. Major mutilations were those in which 
a part of the body was permanently removed from the body. Minor mutilations 
were those in which parts of the body were removed, but not permanently, as in 
the case of the removal of skin and blood, which naturally restore themselves. In 
the light of this distinction, theologians began to wonder if the practices of blood 
transfusions and skin grafts could be morally justified on the basis of the principle 
of totality, given the fact that these are minor mutilations in which parts of the 
body are not permanently removed. It is important to note that a positive answer 
to that question would also lead to the conclusion that, indeed, yes, parts of the 
body can have a legitimate purpose beyond serving the whole body of which it is 
a natural part, as long as the part is restored in order to continue serving the same 
whole body. Note that the moral justification of minor mutilations was not 
originally envisioned by the principle of totality. 
To the best of my knowledge, no one has articulated the moral justification of 
major mutilations, except in terms of the motive of charity. According to the 
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Cathecism of the Catholic Church as well as Veritatis Splendor (and John Paul 
himself points out at the beginning of Veritatis Splendor that this encyclical 
presupposes that one has read the third part of the Cathecism, "Life in Christ") 
the morality of the human act is dependent upon the moral species of the act as 
well as the intention and circumstances. In other words, the morality of a human 
act depends on the what as well as the why, how, when and where. Moreover, a 
good why (even charity) and/ or a good how, when, or where cannot make a bad 
what good. For a human act to be a good act, it must be good in every respect. 
This teaching of the Church, it seems, rules out the argument that, when it comes 
to bodily mutilation for the sake of organ donation, the supernatural virtue 
suspends the natural principle of totality. 
Between the time of Pope Pius XII and that of Pope John Paul II, it does not 
appear that moral theology has accomplished much at all in the realm of the 
ethics of organ transplanting. Generally speaking, one either encounters appeals 
to charity or appeals to what at first might appear to be a new distinction between 
anatomical integrity and functional integrity. On the basis of this distinction, 
some have argued that while one is not obliged to preserve one's anatomical 
integrity, there is the obligation of preserving one's functional integrity. If I have 
more than one of the same organ and can live with just one, the argument goes, 
then it is morally legitimate to donate the organ that I do not need. As it is put in 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Facilities, "The 
transplantation of organs from living donors is morally permissible when such a 
donation will not sacrifice or seriously impare any essential bodily function and 
the anticipated benefit is proportionate to the harm done to the donor."3 
Upon closer inspection, this seemingly new distinction turns out to be the 
principle of totality in disguise, or the principle of totality coming through the 
back door instead of through the front door. It is true that the statement, "It is 
morally legitimate to donate an extra organ that I can function without" differs 
from the statement, "My organ can legitimately serve the body of another 
person." The first statement, based on the distinction between anatomical and 
functional integrity, justifies mutilation in connection with the origin of the 
donation. The second statement justifies mutilation in terms of the end served. 
The first statement principally addresses the bodily welfare of the one donating 
the organ, while the second statement principally addresses the bodily welfare of 
the beneficiary of the donation. It might appear that the distinction between 
anatomical and functional integrity adjusts the principle of totality to the 
possibility of serving as the basis of the moral justification of bodily major 
mutilation for the sake of organ donation by introducing · a mandatory safety 
clause for the donor. However, the bottom line is that it is the principle of totality, 
the principle that Pope Pius XII ruled out, that is being appealed to. Moreover, 
the distinction between anatomical and functional integrity basically sideskirts 
the point at the core of the principle of totality, namely, that at issue is the 
meaning and dignity of human nature as embodied person or personed body. The 
distinction between anatomical and functional integrity, besides serving as the 
backdoor entrance of the principle of totality into the discussion of the ethics of 
organ transplants, fosters the self-understanding of the human person as a set of 
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parts, some of which are expendible. 
My point is that the what of bodily mutilation for the sake of organ donation is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to justify morally. Indeed, that Gaudium et Spes 
labels mutilations as intrinsically evil - and does so without qualification -suggests 
that it is impossible to justify morally. Moreover, there is an aspect of organ 
donation that can be extremely helpful in gaining a deeper appreciation of the 
meaning of the intrinsically evil. 
In their book, Spare Parts, published in 1992, Renee Fox and Judith Swazey 
reviewed their study of the developments in the practice of organ transplanting, a 
study that extended from the I 950s to the present time. Besides noting that organ 
transplanting has been remarkably unsuccessful, the authors chart the map of the 
pattern of the practice over 40 years. Basically, the pattern looks like a fork on the 
road. At first, the practice traveled down one road at the fork, namely, encouraging 
the donor and beneficiary to know each other. The idea behind this practice was the 
humanization of the mutilation and donation. However, as the practice was carried 
out, an unexpected problem arose. Fox and Swazey label the problem "the tyranny 
of the giver." In an overwhelming number of instances, the donor was, in effect, 
incapable of finally letting go of the organ that he or she donated. In the end, the 
donor was incapable of viewing the donated organ as "not-me" or "not-mine." 
Remarkably, this was even more the case in the context of one family member 
donating an organ to another family member. 
It wasn't long before the practice of organ transplanting retreated from that road 
and proceeded on to the second road at the fork, namely, anonymous giving. This 
road has proven to be as problematic as the first, and even more so. Anonymous 
giving has led to the call for the marketing of human organs. Thus, each road, each 
in a different way, leads to the dehumanization of the practice, if it weren't 
dehumanizing in the first place. 
It was for this reason that, after writing their book, Fox and Swazey left the field 
of the study of organ transplanting. However, it was all the more surprising to 
discover that in their book, they miss their own best point. After their discussion of 
the perils ofthe road of anonymous giving, Fox and Swazey reconsider the original 
practice of donor and beneficiary knowing each other, but they swiftly dismiss it in 
defense of anonymous giving! They left the field, to be sure. However, how did they 
manage to fall short ofthe conclusion that organ transplanting crosses the boundary 
of what human nature can support and condone? 
There is another author who can be helpful at this point. Leon R. Kass, in a recent 
article, "Organs for Sale? Property, Propriety, and the Price of Progress,"4 is 
genuinely troubled about the practice of organ transplanting. On the one hand, he is 
well aware ofthe benefit an organ transplant can be for someone. He goes so far as 
to say that ifhis daughter's life could be saved by the donation of his own kidney, he 
would not hesitate to make that donation. On the other hand, Kass seriously 
questions how much wisdom, if any, can flow from the fusion of modem technical 
progress and the love of one's own. 
At one point in his exploration of the benefits of organ transplants, Kass goes as 
far as anyone has ever gone, while still grounded in nature, in the attempt finally to 
articulate the moral justification of bodily major mutilation for the sake of 
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organ donation: 
. .. a donated organ carries with it the donor's generous good will. It is accompanied, so 
to speak, by the generosity of soul of the donor. Symbolically, the "aliveness" of the 
organ requisite for successful transplant bespeaks also the expansive liveliness of the 
donor - even or especially after his death. Thus, organ removal, the partial alientation-of-
self-from-body, turns out to be in this curious way, a reaffirmation of the seWs 
embodiment, thanks to the generous act of donation. 
Even in this argument ofKass - an argument that is, in his mind, a going out on 
a limb in search of a genuine moral justification of the what of bodily major 
mutilation for the sake of organ donation, he is unable - because I think it is 
impossible - to overcome human nature's inability to recognize the donated 
organ as "not-me" or "not-mine." In fact, Kass' attempted moral justification 
depends most of all on viewing the donated organ as "a reaffirmation" of the 
donor's "embodiment," following the alienation-of-self-from-body that con-
stitutes mutilation. Kass' attempted moral justification of bodily major 
mutilation for the sake of donation, you will recall, is the articulation of the 
rationale behind traveling down that first road at the fork as discussed by Fox and 
Swazey: donor and beneficiary knowing each other. As we learned, however, 
that road leads to the "tyranny of the giver." The only way of avoiding human 
nature's inability to recognize the donated organ as "not-me" or "not-mine" is to 
travel down the second road of anonymous giving, which leads to the reduction 
of the human person to a set of marketplace parts. 
If, in the light of Gaudium et Spes and Veritatis Splendor, we must call 
mutilations intrinsically evil, perhaps in hindsight, like Fox and Swazey, we can 
say that we learned that the hard way. However, in having learned it the hard 
way, we can at least draw from this experience the good that we ought not to take 
lightly the notion that a human act can be intrinsically evil and such acts are what 
they are because they cannot avoid dehumanizing us. 
We are the heirs of the legacy of Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon, namely, 
the quest for "the relief of man's estate," "comfortable self-preservation," and 
even, as Descartes envisioned it, bodily immortality. Another way of describing 
their legacy is the attempt to reclaim the tree of life by way of a second try at the 
tree of knowledge of good and evil. A serious consequence of this inheritance is 
that our addiction to technological progress, especially as that progress augments 
and intensifies our natural inclination of self-preservation (which includes the 
natural love of our own bodies) reduces our reasoning about the true and the 
good to rationalizing what we have already willed. In our heart of hearts, we 
don't want there to be anything intrinsically evil. We don't want there to be 
natural limits to what is human. We want to live forever. We are convinced that 
we can figure out how to do so. In short, we still want to be God. We don't 
usually admit this. At best, imitating Bacon and Descartes (and usually 
unconsciously), we put a "kinder, gentler" face on it by speaking about our 
augmented and intensified love of our bodies in altruistic terms: we want to help 
others. Quite often this is genuine charity. Even so, we would have to say that, if 
we have Christian hearts, we still have Cartesian minds. A good why - even a 
Christian why - does not make a bad what good. 
56 Linacre Quarterly 
Think of Verilalis Splendor as the cherubim placed by God in the Garden of 
Eden to guard with a flaming sword (the splendor of the truth) the way to the tree 
of life. 
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